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The general statutes, i3o of the State of Washington, provide that
in cities of the third-class the council shall annually, ata stated time, con-
tract for doing all city printing and advertising, which contract shall be
let to the lowest bidder. At the proper time two bids were presented to
the defendant city and the council awarded the contract to B, whose bid
,was at $r per inch for solid nonpareil for the first and 5o cents for each
subsequent insertion, while appellant's bid was at 25 and 15 cents respec-
tively for the same, the council declaring by resolution that B was the
lowest and best bidder. Held, that a city will not be compelled by man-
damus to award a contract to the lowest bidder for city work required by
.statute to be let to the lowest bidder.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
STILES, J. "The generally accepted rule is that the courts
will not by mandamus compel a municipal corporation to enter
into a contract with one who shows himself to have been the
lowest bidder in a competition of this kind.;"
MANDAMUS AND THE LOWEST BIDDER.
The rule as stated by STILES, J., like all general rules, is not
without its qualifications and like most applications of the
-common law to statutory law is subject to varying refinements
in different States. Our labor will not be lost' if we make
clear the grounds on which the decisions have been based.
' Reported in 37 Pac. Rep. 695 [18941.
MANDAMUS AND THE LOWEST BIDDER.
It has been well said that a mandamus will lie where there.
is (a) a clear iegal right in the relator, (b) a corresponding
duty in the defendant, and (c) a want of any other adequate
and specific remedy : CommonwealthI v. Councils of Pillsburg,
34 Pa. 496; and a mandamus has been refused to the lowest
bidder for a city contract, because either one or all of these
three essentials have, in the opinion of the learned court, been
lacking. The grounds for the refusal of the writ may for our
purpose be arranged, however, in a more convenient order as
follows: i. The duties of the proper authorities in such a
case are discretionary and not ministerial simply; -2. It would
be against public policy to cancel a contract and award it to
another wivere the work has already been entered upon or
completed and expenses incurred; 3. Such statutes are for the
benefit of the State and not for individual bidders, and, there-
fore, the relator has no clear legal right. We will consider
these three heads separately as much as may be.
i. It was on the first ground that the decision in the prin-
cipal case was rested rather than on the second. For, as the
petition prayed both for an injunction to restrain the city and
B from carrying out the contract and also for a mandamus to
compel the awarding of the contract to the petitioner, the
court rever-ed the judgment of the court below for defendant
on demurrer, and though the contract had been awarded, they
remanded the cause with instructions to overrule the demurrer
and proceed upon the cause of action sustained. It was sought
to distinguish this from Baum v. Sweeney, 5 Wash. 712;
S.C., 32 Pac. Rep. 778 [1893], on the ground that that was an
appeal from the commissioners to the superior court direct.
That case arose under the same statute, which required the
public printing to be awarded to the lowest bidding newspaper,
which must have been published in the county for six months
prior, and the county commissioners awarded the contract to
a paper which had not been published for six months. It was
held that it.was proper to direct the commissioners to relet
the contract as provided by law, although this was a virtual
mandamus to let it to the only other bidder, for under the facts
as thei'e ;as only one legal bid, the commissioners had no
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discretion. But it is hard to see a very marked distinction
between a mandamus on an appeal direct from the award and
a mandamus in a suit separate and apart from an appeal.
The rule as stated in the principal case seems to be firmly
established in Pennsylvania. The case of Comnsnwealtlt
ex rel. v. Mitchell et al., 82 Pa. 343 [1876], in construing the
Act of May 23, 1874, which requires that "all work and
materials required by the city . . . shall be performed under
contract to be given to the lowest responsible bidder," held
that the word responsible was not limited in its meaning to
.pecuniary responsibility, but in contracts whose execution
required judgment and skill as well as pecuniary 'ability, the
statute imposes duties and powers which are deliberative and
discretionary, and, therefore, where the city authorities have
exercised a discretion, mandamus will not lie to compel them
to modify their decision, even though -their action was erron-
.2ous (as in this case), in-the absence of clear proof of fraud or
bad faith. This decision was affirmed in Douglass v.. Com-
zmonwealtz, io8 Pa. 559 [1885].
The Illinois rule is the same, where the charter of the
city of Chicago contained this provision: "All contracts
shall be awarded by said board to the lowest reliable and
responsible bidder or bidders who shall have complied with
the above , requisition, and who will sufficiently guarantee to
the satisfaction of said board the performance of said work,"
and the Board of Public Works advertised for sealed proposals
for the construction of a new "lake tunnel" of the estimated
value of $4oo,000, reserving the right to. reject any bid not in
accordance with the conditions of the advertisement or to
reject all bids, it was held no mandamus would issue at the
suit of one whose bid was $4,000 less than the one accepted.
The court said "Whenever the act sought to have done
requires the exercise of discretion, this remedy will not lie :"
.elly v. City of Chicago, 62 Ill. 279 [1871].
In Missouri, in a case arising under a statute similar to that
in the principal case requiring the contract for printing to be
awarded the lowest responsible bidder, the court refused to
interfere, because the statute gave the board discretionary
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power: State ex rel. v. AilcGratk et al., 'Commissioners of Public
Printing, 9r Mo. 386 [r886].
2. In New York State the rule seems to be that where the
contract has been entered into and expense incurred man-
damus will not be issued. The case of People v. Canal
Board, 13 Barb. 432 [1852], is hardly in point, for under the
facts of the case the board had undoubtedly much greater dis-
cretion than in the cases We are considering, where the
statute requires the contract to be awarded to the lowest
responsible bidder. In this case the canal board resolved to
award the contracts "to such parties as shall propose to per-
form the work on terms most safe and advantageous to the
State, having due regard to price, the ability of the parties
and the security offered," and a mandamus to compel the
board to approve of a contract entered into by the State
engineer wa§ refused on the ground that the mandamus was
really an action against the State, and further that the relator
had shown no clear legal right. But in the People ex rel.
3ehd, n v. Conti-acting board, 27 N. Y. 378 [1863], the law
required the canal contracting board to award all contracts for
repairs to "the lowest bidder who will give adequate security,"
and the proposals for a contract required a certificate of deposit
of 84,coo in cash to accompany the bid. Belden's bid was
accompanied by the required certificate, save that the words
"in cash " did not appear, and the board, for this reason,
refused to award the contract to him. The Supreme Court
criticized this technical objection, but refused to issue a man-
damus to cancel the contract already awarded and enter into
one with the relator. EmroTr, J., adverted to the principle that
wherever the act requires the exercise of discretion the remedy
by mandamus will not lie, but based his decision on the
ground that the contract was already awarded. "The
Supreme Court ought not to have compelled the-board by
mandamus to reverse their action or to make a contract with
relator, after they had already made another contract with
another person." SELDEN, J., dissented on the ground that
the statule made it the absolute duty of the board to award
the cont,'ict to the lowest bidder. T!i, decision was con-
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siderably shaken in People ex rel. Vickman" v. Contracting
Board, 46 Barb. 254 [1865], where the proposals called for a
certificate of deposit to the order of the auditor, and relator
filed one to his own order, but endorsed to the order of the
auditor, and for this reason the bid was rejected, though he
was the lowest bidder. Held, that the board bad no discre-
tion in the matter, but should give the contract to relator. It
was distinguished from People ex rel. Belden v. Board, sup ra,
on the ground that there the contract had already been en-
tered into with another. It was also pointed out that but four
of the judges concurred with the opinion of EMOTT, J., in that
case which was not a majority, and they only concurred gen-
erally. See also People ex rel. Lumey v. Campbell, 72 N. Y.
496 [I878]; People v. Wendel, 57 Hun. 362 [1890].
Michigan follows the New York rule: Detroit Free Press v_
Board of Auditors, 47 Mich. 135 [I88I1.
In Talbot Paving Co. v. Common Council, 51 N. W. Rep;.
933 [Supreme Court Michigan, 1892], the contract had been.
performed b, another, and the court in its discretion refused
to grant a writ of mandamus. This was on the ground that-
the city would have to pay twice for the work, if the man-
damus was issued.
3. Such statutes are for the benefit of the State and not for,
individual bidders, and therefore the relators have no clear-
legal right. This is the rule adopted by Wisconsin. Where-
the charter of the city required the work on a school-house to,
be let out to "the lowest responsible bidder," and relators
showed that they were the lowest bidder and that they were
responsible, PAINE, J., held that in such a case "the lowest
bidder has no such fixed absolute right that he is entitled to,
a mandamus to compel the letting of the contract to him, after
his bid has been in fact rejected and the contract awarded to,
another. The statutory provision requiring the contract in
such cases to be let to the lowest bidder is designed for the
benefit and protection of the public and not of the bidder: "
State ex rel. v. Board of Education, 24 Wis. 683 [1869] ; see,
also, Kelly v. City of Clicago, 62 Il1. 279 [1871]. The
.Supreme Court of Maryland in refusing a mandamus where
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the work ha .d already been entered upon said: " It is of much
more impoLtance that a public contract like the one in question
should be promptly awarded and speedily executed with due
regard to economy than that any particular bidder should get
the contract:" Madison v. Harbor Board of Baltimore, 25
Ati. Rep. 337 [18g2].
The same rule was applied in Vermont, where on the face
of the petition the granting of the mandamus would be dis-
advantageous to the State, as the contract had already been
awarded to one B at a figure $2,ooo less than relator's bid, as
the principal object of the law was to benefit the State: Free
Press v. Secretary of State, 45 Vt. 7; also, Welsit v. Board of
.Supcrvisors, 23 Iowa, 203 [1867].
Where the Legislature has left the matter of placing con-
tracts in the discretion of the proper authorities and have
enacted no statute requiring contracts to be awarded to the
lowest responsible bidder, the writ has been refused: Mayo v.
County Commissioners, 141 Mass. 74 [1886]; State ex rel.
THuse v. Board, etc., Dixon County, 24 Neb. io6 [1888]; State
ex rel. Bare v. Lincoln County, 35 Neb. 346 [1892]; S. C., 53
N. W. Rep. 147.
The courts of Ohio and Nebraska have both decided that
.where the proper facts are shown a mandamus will lie to
award the contract to the lowest bidder. Where the statute
required the contract to be awarded to the person "who shall
offer to perform the labor and furnish the materials at the
lowest price aid give good and sufficient bond," and the com-
missioners had awarded the contract to R for PI3,000 more
than B's bid, though it was claimed by the commissioners
that R's bid included the brick which was not, however,
named in the specifications submitted by the architect; Held,
that a peremptory mandamus would issue in favor of B. "It
is the obvious policy and intention of the statute to render such
favoritism impossible. .The commissioners are invested with
no such discretion. On the contrary, it is the clear intent and
policy of the statute to withhold it and thereby shut the door
against alt favoritism:" Boren & Guckes v. Commissioners of
D.arkc County, 21 Ohio, 311 [1871]. But the writ was refused
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-to one, who had, slept on his rights: State v. Commissioners of
.rinting, 18 Ohio, 386 [1868]; and the relator must show
that his was actually the lowest bid: State v Commisioners of
Hamilton County, 20 Ohio4 425 [r87o]; and that he has fully
• complied with the specifications: American Clock Co.,v. Com-
aissioners. of, Licking. County, 30 Ohio, 415 [1877]. But
where the award has been made to the lowest bidder, and he
has failed to enter into. the contract by giving sufficient
:security, the commissioners have the right to readvertise and
will not be compelled by mandamus to give the contract to the
,next lowest bidder: State v. Commissioners of Slelby County,
36 Ohio, 326 [1881]. Where the trustees of an asylum had
.allowed B to change his bid and thus lower it after'the
proposals had been opened, on the ground that he had
-included an article not called for in the specifications, it was
held a mandamus would lie to compel the awarding of the
contract to the original bidder, as the trustees had no right to
accept any but the original proposals. "The statute knows
no other proposals or offers but these. The trustees are
invested with no discretion in the matter; but, on the contrary,
we are satisfied it is the intefit and policy of the statute to
withhold it and thereby shut the door against all favoritism on
the part of the trustees on the one hand, and on the other
-to prevent such-an excited intriguing, and perhaps ruinous
scramble, among bidders as would be not unlikely to ensue
:if the proceedings were assimilated to an open auction sale
of contracts : "-.Beaver & Butt v. Trustees of Blind Asylum,
19 Ohio, 97 [1869]. .
In. Nebraska, where the statute enacted that the county
-commissioners might let contracts to "the lowest competent
bidder" it was held that this was mandatory on the commis-
sioners, and, if they did not give the contract to the lowest
bidder, mandamus would issue. As to the right to maintain
-this action the court say-: "There'is no doubt of the right of
-the lowest responsible bidder or of a tax-payer of the proper
-county in a proper case to maintain an action of this kind,
.and in no other way can the rights of bidders and the public
;be fully secured and enforced:" People v. Commissioners of.
MANDAMUS AND THE LOWEST BIDDER-
Buffalo Couty, 4 Neb. r5o [I8751- In its opinion the learned-
court quoted judge Dillon as follows: "The cases sustain
the doctrine that what public corporations or officers are em--
powered to do for others, and which is beneficial, to them to
have dotie, the law holds they ought to do .... The power,
in such cases, is conferred for the benefit of others and the
intent of the Legislature, which is the test in such cases ordi-
narily seems, under such circumstances,.tobeto impose a posi-
tive and absolute duty:" Dillon on MuMinipal Corp., § 6z..
Here as in Ohio the relator must showthat his bid conforms
with the specifications: State ex rd. Si/ver v. Kendal, 15 Neb.
263 [18833; State ex rel. v. Cmnty Board of York Couny,
17 Neb. 643 [1885].
As to the right of the lowest bidder to bring this actioii for
mandamus in his own name instead of the attorney-general's
the cases differ: State v. Board of Education, supa; People v.
Buffalo Couhty, supra. Michigan has adopted the same rule-'
as Nebraska. In. Ayers v. State Auditors, 42 Mich. 42z
[188o], the court pertinently asks. "In as much then as the-
attorney-general refuses to appear and seek the enforcement
of the statutory provision (to award to the lowest bidder).
does his refusal preclude its enforcement? And, if not, is the
relator authorized to bring the matter before this court? "
And the court answers- this in the -affirmative by declaring-
that where as here the attorney-general had compromised
himself as adviser of the State officers, and so would not peti-
tion for the writ and refused to appear and seek the enforce-
ment qf the statutory provision, then it was proper for one
who, as here, had some interest in the matter, as one who was
engaged in business, which made him a competent bidder, to-
petition for the .writ It has been decided in New York State-
that in all cases requiring redress and involving a -matter in
-which the interests of the public at large are concetned, and
in respect to which a. mandamus is a proper remedy, it is
competent for the courts to act upon the relation and motion
of a private citizen of the State: People v. Collier, x9 Wend.
56 [1837]; People v. Tracyjudge, I Denio, 617 [1845]. This
doctrine has been followed by the Supreme Court of Illinois:
9o6-
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Pike v. State, II Ill. 202 ; Hallv. People, 57 Ill. 312 ; Vilage
of Glencoe v. People, 78 Ill. 39o. This, however, seems to be
opposed to the English rule, and Maine, Massachusetts and
Pennsylvania have maintained a contrary doctrine, and hold
that to entitle an individual citizen to be heard as relator, and
on his own motion he must show that he has some individual
interest in the subject-matter of complaint, which is not corn-
mofi to all the citizens of the State: Commonwealth v. Mit-
chell, 82 Pa. 343 1876]; Mayo v. County Commissioners,
141 Mass. 74 [1886].
Where the specifications call for bids upon a, patented
article in the control of one company, as the Nicholson pave-
ment, the courts again differ as to the legality of the contract..
California and Wisconsin have declared such contracts illegal
and void: Nicholson Pavement Co. v. Painter, 35 Cal. 699.
[1868]; Dean v. Charlton, 23 Wis. 590 [1869]; also approved.
in New York, Dolan v. Mayor, 4 Abb. Pr. N. S. 397 [1868];
and in Louisiana, Burgess v.Jefferson, 21 La. An. 143 [18691..
The Michigan cdurts hold such contracts legal: Hobart v.
Detroit, 17 Mich. 246 [1868].
The principal point to be determined before granting a man--
damus in the cases we have been discussing, would seem to be
the intention of the Legislature in enacting that all contracts.
should be given to "-the lowest responsible bidder," or "the
lowest bidder giving satisfactory security." If they meant to
limit the discretion of the city or county authorities to the-
mere awarding of the contract to the lowest and most respon-
sible bidder, then it would seem that the Tright to the award of'
the contract is complete as soon as the bids are opened and
the lowest bidder appears, and it is difficult to see wherein the
contracting official acts otherwise than as a ministerial officer.
While, if the Legislature intended, as the Pennsylvania cases
hold, to give the contracting officer full discretion in the-
awarding of contracts, it is hard to see why any restriction
was placed on him at all. It has been well said that a
provision in a city charter, that all contracts should "be given
to the lowest responsible bidder giving adequate security, was-
inserted in the charter undoubtedly to prevent favoritism,.
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corruption, extravagance and improvidence in the procurement
of work and supplies for the city, and it should be so adminis-
tered and construed as fairly and reasonably to accomplish
this purpose:" People ex rel. Coughlin v. Gleason, 25 N. E.
Rep. 4 [N. Y. Ct. of App. 189o].
It is true that, as in the principal case, an injunction will
sometimes be granted to restrain the proposed contract with
a higher bidder: Mazetv. Pittsburgh, 137 Pa. 548 [189o].
But the injunction is a negative remedy, and it is a question
whether the courts do not virtually nullify the statute and
disregard the intention of the Legislature by refusing the writ
-of mandamus. CHARLES F. EGGLESTON.
